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The accession of the east-Central european (eCe) countries carried a promise of enhanc-
ing and enriching the eU’s eastern policy. The new member states had the strongest 
interests among eU member states to ensure that countries in the east are prosperous, 
stable, and democratic. Yet, the eU’s eastern policy has been largely criticised for its 
ineffectiveness. So why have they not been able to address the shortcomings in the eU’s 
eastern policies? The article argues that the eCe countries supported the way the eU’s 
eastern policies were conceived and implemented because they saw it as a potent vehicle 
to promote their own transition experience not only in the region but also within the eU. 
We argue that the eCe states have experienced three types of challenges when promoting 
their transition experience. First, uploading to the eU level remained largely at a rhetori-
cal level. Second, there are conceptual and practical difficulties in defining what consti-
tutes transition experience and harnessing it, as well as coordinating its transfer between 
the eCe states. Finally, while using transition experience as the basis for their develop-
ment assistance strategies, the eCe countries actually insufficiently conceptualised the 
“development” aspect in these policies. Being so driven by their own experience, they 
have not drawn the lessons from enlargement to use in a non-accession context, espe-
cially by incorporating the broader lessons with regard to development.
Keywords:  East-Central Europe; Transition Experience; European Neighbourhood 
Policy; post-Soviet states
Introduction
The european Union’s policy in its eastern neighbours has received much schol-
arly criticism.1 eU engagement with the region replicates the logic of enlargement, as 
it focuses on the approximation of national legislation to the acquis communautaire, 
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various forms of aid, deeper trade links, assistance, and twinning, but without offering 
prospect of membership. Adoption of eU rules has increasingly been seen as a tool 
to promote the development of the countries in the region. However, it is highly 
questionable whether this is so, and most observers agree that so far the eU has been 
unable to promote sustainable change in the region. For many, the Vilnius Summit in 
November 2013 exemplified the weakness of the eU’s influence on the eastern 
neighbors, when only two out of four countries which concluded the Association 
Agreements signed them in Vilnius. Russia’s backlash against the eU’s engagement 
in the region, including a resort to military power, has raised a number of important 
questions for the eU and has highlighted flaws in the design of its eastern neighbor-
hood policies.2 Most importantly, the impact of the eU on domestic reforms has been 
very limited,3 with no evidence of a wide-ranging, successful, and sustained process 
of domestic reforms in the eastern neighbors.4
Several years back, the accession of the east-Central european (eCe) countries 
carried a promise of enhancing and enriching the eU’s eastern policy. These coun-
tries have perhaps the strongest interests among eU member states to ensure that 
countries in the east are prosperous, stable, and democratic. So why have they not 
been able to address the shortcomings in the eU’s eastern policies? In fact, we argue 
that while voicing some criticism, they have generally accepted and even promoted 
a policy which has been clearly unable to deliver on its proclaimed objectives. We 
accept the premise that any engagement in its eastern neighborhood is perceived by 
most of the eCe states as a better outcome than the lack of such engagement, and 
since their criticisms of the eU’s eastern policies were ignored, these states are doing 
what they expect would be at least some improvement to the lack of their involve-
ment in the eU’s policies—supporting the eU’s engagement and exporting their 
transition experiences through it. However, it is still surprising that despite the lack 
of visible results, the eU’s neighborhood policy seems to have enjoyed relatively 
widespread support among the eCe member states, which have accepted it as a 
ready-made formula for political and economic modernization.
The over-riding position appears to be that “the model worked for us so it should 
work for you,” indicating that they seem to be mesmerized by their own experience 
of enlargement and being “pupils” of the eU during the accession to “the club.”5 
Consequently, they assumed the role of sympathetic, newly trained teachers in the 
eastern neighborhood and made this mission central to the construction of their 
development assistance policies.6 However, in many respects, they did so without 
reflecting on their experience and updating it to a changed context of the new 
“pupils.” The article argues that the eCe countries supported the way the eU’s 
eastern policies were conceived and implemented because they saw it as a potent 
vehicle to promote their own transition experience, not only in the region but also 
within the eU. In eCe, transition experience has a broad meaning and essentially 
denotes the whole post-communist reform process and preparation for eU member-
ship, as these two processes became closely intertwined in the first decade and half 
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following the collapse of communism. The eCe countries’ experience of economic 
and political transition as well as eU integration is said to be highly relevant for the 
situations found in the eastern neighbors of the eU, as they share many historical 
and social characteristics with the new member states and still have need of exten-
sive political and economic reforms, while at the same time pursuing economic 
integration in the eU’s single market. The eastern neighborhood is deemed an arena 
in which the transition experience of eCe states may assist in the simultaneous 
process of domestic reforms and integration with the eU. Thus, the eCe countries 
have all been highly keen on promoting their experience, which they see as a way 
to enrich the eU’s policies and make them more relevant for the region. The convic-
tion that eCe transition experience would help the eastern neighbors in their reform 
and integration processes and thus contribute to regional security, however, is only 
one motivation. There is also a second, less emphasized, economic motivation: if 
eCe transition experience is unique and it truly contributes to enriching the eU’s 
eastern policies, then the eU should financially support its transfer to the eastern 
neighbors.
However, promoting transition experience is easier said than done. We argue that 
the eCe states have experienced three types of challenges in this process. First, 
uploading to the eU level has not been entirely successful and remained largely at a 
rhetorical level. Second, there are conceptual and practical difficulties in defining 
what actually constitutes transition experience and harnessing it, as well as coordi-
nating its transfer between the eCe states. Finally, while using transition experience 
as the basis for their development assistance strategies, the eCe countries actually 
insufficiently conceptualized the “development” aspect in these policies. They do 
not scrutinize the appropriateness of enlargement instruments when applied to non-
accession states through a critical reflection on their own preparation of membership 
in order to enhance the effectiveness of the eU’s rule transfer outside the context of 
enlargement. eCe officials both in eU institutions and in the national capitals have 
shown a high level of confidence in the “transformative power” of the acquis. Being 
so driven by their own experience, they have not drawn the lessons from enlargement 
to use in a non-accession context, especially by incorporating the broader lessons 
from the field of international development.
The article therefore focuses on the question of chain-like diffusion and argues 
that having been a target country for successful rule transfer does not make an effec-
tive promoter of those rules with a view to promote socio-economic modernization 
in the post-Soviet countries. Actually, the eCe countries stimulated the eU’s engage-
ment in the eastern neighborhood but in many respects could not rectify the inherent 
weaknesses of the eU approach to seeking “europeanization without enlargement.”
The article is structured as follows. The next section discusses the main outlines 
of the eU’s neighborhood policy. The third section describes the approach that the 
eCe countries have taken towards eU policies in the region. The fourth section dis-
cusses the difficulties that using transition experience in the eastern neighborhood 
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poses for the eCe countries. The final section concludes the article by making some 
analytical generalization arguing that an increased focus on legal approximation is an 
inappropriate tool to promote socio-economic modernization in the region.
The Nature of EU Policies towards the Eastern Neighborhood
Launched in 2004, the eNP is a composite policy with the ambitious aims of 
promoting democracy, economic development and security. At first, the eNP relied 
on soft-law instruments, such as Action Plans and Progress Reports. However, by 
late 2000s the focus shifted. After Ukraine began the negotiations on the Association 
Agreement, this offer was rolled out to other eastern neighbors within the eastern 
Partnership (eaP), launched in 2009. The Association Agreement represents a water-
shed in the eU’s relations with the partner countries because it offers a highly legal-
ized, binding framework for progressive economic integration. Its economic part, 
the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), goes beyond a “standard” 
FTA agreement by its emphasis on regulatory approximation. It is a deliberate shift 
from a vague reform agenda to a legal framework with specific and detailed com-
mitments to adopt eU rules in exchange for a greater access to the eU single market. 
Therefore, even more than the eNP, the eaP follows the logic of enlargement by 
advocating extensive domestic reforms in partner countries during which the adop-
tion of eU rules, the acquis, and the implied conditionality attached to the acquis, is 
viewed as a key to democratization and socio-economic modernization.
The eNP and the eaP are highly ambitious, having as their formal objectives 
nothing less than promoting democracy, economic prosperity, and security. However, 
the way that the eNP and eaP have been implemented in the eastern neighborhood 
indicate a hierarchy of objectives: in general, socio-economic modernization has 
taken priority over democratization.7 This is at least partially explained by the nature 
of the eU itself. The eNP/eaP are composite policies, the multiple objectives of 
which cut across varied functional domains, which are governed by different institu-
tional arrangements within the eU.8 Areas such as external trade, visa policy, conflict 
management, or democracy support are characterized by different competences of 
eU institutions. For example, trade issues are a clear competence of the eU whereas 
democracy is relatively weakly institutionalized; thereby, eU member states have a 
much greater freedom of action in democracy promotion than on trade issues. As 
democracy promotion has been already covered elsewhere,9 in this article, we focus 
on socio-economic modernization of the post-Soviet countries, which the eCe coun-
tries strongly subscribed to (and referring to it as development).
Like enlargement, the eNP and the eaP are indelibly intertwined with the expan-
sion of the eU’s rules beyond its borders. With the eNP, which was conceived paral-
lel to enlargement, and even more so with the eastern Partnership, the eU’s strategy 
has centered on an intensive process of rule transfer to the post-Soviet countries. The 
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full analysis of the motives of the eU are beyond the scope of this article;10 however, 
this process of rule transfer is underpinned by the view that convergence with eU 
rules will ultimately bring stability and prosperity in the eastern neighborhood, as 
was the case in eCe. Inside the eU, enlargement created a strong belief that adoption 
of the acquis equates with development, which is broadly defined as modernization 
of state policies and institutions, and the economic growth.11
The beneficial effects of rule transfer are not limited to increased revenues from 
trade but include increased investment, enhanced competition, and reduced corrup-
tion, which lead to better governance and higher economic efficiency, growth, and 
welfare in partner countries. The process of alignment with the regulatory mecha-
nisms developed in the eU is thus ultimately expected to transform the public poli-
cies of the neighboring states, resulting in growth, stability, and prosperity.
However, in the neighborhood, functional integration became detached “from the 
possibilities available to european countries under Article 49 of the Treaty on 
european Union.”12 Instead, the eU has been seeking to exert its influence in the 
post-Soviet space by promoting “economic integration and political cooperation” 
with partner countries. This strategy was premised on a close connection between 
economic integration and the extensive adoption of the acquis. The dual justification 
usually provided relates to market access and developmental benefits. This means 
that whereas in eCe, the countries’ preparation for membership justified the adop-
tion of eU rules, in the neighborhood context eU rules came to be perceived as a 
template for modernization of states which not only had no perspective for member-
ship but also had lower levels of development than the eCe countries had in the 
1990s. Why has the eU’s eastern policy become so infused with the export of eU 
rules? Besides representing the internal “genetic code of european integration,” the 
acquis has served as a consensual basis for eU foreign policy making, or as put by 
Magen,13 the embodiment of the eU’s external “transformative engagement through 
law.” The Lisbon Treaty empowers the Union to “develop a special relationship with 
neighboring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighborli-
ness, founded on the values of the Union” (TeU article 8). As Hillion argues, by 
“partly codifying past eU engagement towards its vicinity, [the Lisbon Treaty] does 
further than that: it establishes a specific eU competence for norms exports, enshrines 
its mandatory character and adjusts its purpose.”14 The codification of eU’s “trans-
formative power” plays an important role in the eastern neighborhood context, 
where eU policy has been accompanied by a lack of consensus on the ultimate strat-
egy and finalité vis-à-vis the eastern european countries.
In the absence of such consensus, the eU engages by promoting primarily what 
it already agrees upon, that is, its corpus of norms and rules. While the import of the 
acquis was singled out as a major accession criterion under the enlargement process 
designed in the 1990s, since the last wave of enlargement the acquis has also 
emerged as a key link connecting eU members with each other in a context of grow-
ing heterogeneity: “Portugal and Poland might not agree on various aspects of the 
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eU’s political relations with Ukraine; both Portugal and Poland agree, however, that 
the export of the eU acquis to Ukraine is a good thing from the point of their 
national interests.”15 Therefore, the export of the acquis serves as a backbone of 
consensus within the eU, underpinning the strategy towards the eastern neigh-
bors.16 Still, for many member states, the eastern neighborhood had hardly been a 
foreign policy priority until the Ukrainian crisis, remaining a “third-tier policy.”17 
Because of the sheer difficulty to persuade the reluctant eU member states, such as 
France, Spain, Italy, and Portugal, about the merits of engagement in the eastern 
neighborhood, there was a considerable reluctance among the eCe member states 
to criticize the policy because of fear of weakening its support amongst the “reluc-
tant” member states. Instead, it has been presented as a cost-effective and low-risk 
way to build on the positive experiences of enlargement, but without the costs and 
risks of enlargement.
These considerations reflect and enhance the centrality of sector-specific, techni-
cal rules to the eU as an international organization and foreign policy actor.18 
Accession conditionality based on the adoption of the acquis worked in the 2004 and 
2007 enlargements19 or even in the Western Balkans.20 According to an eU official, 
“the wider acquis is often attractive to eNP partners, given that the eU has a well-
established and complex mechanism to elaborate standard-setting sectoral policies 
that is not replicated elsewhere.”21 The possibility of accession, however, is absent in 
the case of the eastern neighborhood. Nevertheless, this is a new territory for the eU: 
there is no precedent for promoting the acquis as a template for development and 
modernization without a concurrent offer of a membership perspective.22
No doubt, the export of the acquis in the eU’s eastern policy offers many advan-
tages for the eU, not least preventing time-consuming negotiations on various 
aspects of reform and devising a tailor-made reform strategy for the eastern partners. 
This task has simply been beyond the capacity of eU officials charged with imple-
menting the eNP and the eaP. This lack of capacity is reflected in the approach to the 
Association Agreements, whereby the text negotiated with Ukraine became a tem-
plate for Moldova and georgia with few modifications. As Magen argues, 
“Commission officials are deeply averse to the possibility of having to repeat the 
Swiss experience of tailor-made, sector-specific agreements in future negotiations 
with other eU partners.”23 The wholesale rule transfer is also believed to reflect the 
needs of the eastern partners. According to the Commission officials Dodini and 
Fantini, the neighbors face a choice of either adopting eU acquis or developing a 
regulatory framework from scratch.24 They also argue that the eU model is superior 
to that of other international actors in terms of the quality and density of its regula-
tion and the comprehensiveness of reform it entails. The idea was that all eaP states 
are to benefit from modernizing their public policies and economies, and thereby 
benefit in developmental terms, by anchoring them in the eU model of governance, 
regardless of their actual aspirations or capacities to achieve this.
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Summing up, the eU’s eastern policies very much focused on the adoption of eU 
rules as fast-track to development and modernization. However, it is widely agreed 
that this policy has so far achieved little visible results. We now turn to understanding 
how the eCe member states have supported the policy in order to explain why they 
have been unable to enhance its effectiveness, despite having relevant transition 
experience.
The ECE Member States and the Eastern Neighbourhood
Since accession to the eU, the eCe states have been ardent supporters of eU 
engagement with the eastern neighbors through the eNP and the eaP. The eCe 
states have strong interests towards the eNP/eaP, given the geo-political connec-
tions between the two sub-regions.25 The eCe states have been relatively successful 
in shifting the eU’s agenda towards the eastern neighbors, albeit with the support of 
older member states, such as germany and Sweden.26 The geopolitical proximity of 
countries in the eastern region, issues such as energy security, and the shadow of 
Russian influence all highlight that it is a vital security and economic interest for the 
eCe countries that the eNP countries really develop and stabilize.
If regional development and stability is a key interest for the eCe countries, then 
why do they support the eU’s eNP in its current form, which, as argued above, is 
unlikely to promote these goals? We argue that the highly legalistic and technical 
nature of the eU’s policies actually fits the eCe countries’ own perception and expe-
rience of development for three inter-related reasons. First, these countries have 
themselves been beneficiaries of the eU’s “transformative power,” and throughout 
this integration process, intertwined with their wider economic, social, and political 
transitions, they have accumulated a vast amount of experience in how to do reforms. 
Second, drawing on their own experience, eCe member states uncritically accept the 
eU as a “force of good” in the eastern neighborhood without considering what is 
needed to make the eU an effective “force for good” outside the context of enlarge-
ment. Third, most crucially, they see their “transition experience” as something 
which can enrich the eU’s policies in promoting stability and prosperity in the neigh-
borhood and see the transfer of the acquis as instrumental to achieve this objective.
Transition experience is heralded by the eCe states as the value added that they 
bring to development policy. It refers to the fact that eCe states underwent transition 
between 1989 and 2004 (economic transformation to market economies and political 
transition to democracies), and their experiences from this process can be transferred 
to other states undergoing—what is perceived as—similar transitions. This experi-
ence is unique to the eCe states, as their transitions happened simultaneously with 
their process of implementing the acquis. During this process, they carried out wide-
ranging reforms, in particular the organization of free and fair elections, the construc-
tion of checks and balances, judicial reform, macroeconomic stabilization, 
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liberalization, the privatization of state assets, etc. Although different countries 
adopted different solutions to various problems raised during the transition process 
while adopting the acquis and building relevant institutions, it is generally agreed 
that the alignment with eU policies has been a success,27 although the state of democ-
racy in some eCe states is not without its critics.28 eCe transition experience is none 
the less seen as a reform model for countries in the eastern neighborhood to follow, 
especially with regard to meeting the acquis, whatever form their association with 
the eU will take.29
The eCe states have strongly reaffirmed the importance of the transfer of transi-
tion experience as a central element in their international development policies, as 
evidenced by several policy papers and legal documents from the region. A very 
good example of this is the wording found in the Czech Republic’s Development 
Cooperation Strategy for 2010–2017:
The Czech Republic has a comparative advantage over most of the established donor 
countries—its experience of a process of political, economic and social transformation. 
It seeks to capitalize on this advantage in cooperation with countries undergoing simi-
lar changes, and in countries where the democratic process has not been initiated.30
Very similar statements can be found, for example, in Slovakia’s Medium Term 
Strategy for Development Cooperation 2014–201831 or Poland’s Multiannual 
Development Cooperation Programme for 2012–2015.32 Hungary’s International 
Development Policy Strategy for 2014–2020 stresses institutional development as 
one of the three main priority sectors where Hungary supports its partners, and the 
role Hungarian state institutions can play in this. These countries have also created 
dedicated institutional structures to promote their transition experience, such as the 
Transition Promotion Programme (Czech Republic), the International Centre for 
Democratic Transition (Hungary), the International Solidarity Fund (Poland), and 
the Transformation experience Sharing Programme (Slovakia).
The transfer of transition experience became therefore a key element in the bilat-
eral development policies of the eCe countries, and they have indeed engaged in a 
wide number of projects in the eastern neighborhood, ranging from assisting the 
reform of ombudsman services in Moldova (Hungary) to supporting customs reform 
in Ukraine (Czech Republic). All eCe states also support the activities which their 
civil society organizations undertake in the region, which includes training local civil 
society organizations in issues like advocacy, campaigning, or fund raising. Thus, we 
see training courses funded by Slovenia related to the empowerment of women or 
Czech courses training journalists.33 These bilateral efforts, while often welcomed by 
the partner countries, receive relatively small amounts of funding, and have in some 
cases been accused of being donor-driven and ineffective.34 On some occasions, 
however, the eCe projects do address the needs and priorities of the partner coun-
tries, albeit usually on a very modest scale. For example, the small-scale analysis 
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conducted by a Romanian think-tank of Moldovan developmental needs in agribusi-
ness provided a very thorough and sobering assessment of the underdevelopment of 
this key sector for the Moldovan economy.35 This filled an important gap, given the 
eU’s lack of attention to functional needs of the partner countries, including the need 
to reach out beyond governmental institution and engage producers’ associations.
This then raises an important question: can eCe transition experience enrich the 
eU’s eastern policies and compensate for its deficiencies? Clearly, the eCe coun-
tries have made attempts to upload transition experience to the eU level, with the 
argument being that it could make eU assistance more relevant for the eastern part-
ners. The following section discusses why transition experience, despite its promise, 
has generally failed to enrich the eU’s eastern policies.
Why Has ECE Transition Experience Failed to Enrich the EU’s 
Eastern Policies?
We argue that the eCe states have achieved some success in streamlining their 
transition experience into eU policies, but in general this is rather limited because 
of three reasons. First, uploading transition experience to the eU has been met by 
some resistance. Second, actually using transition experience poses severe practical 
problems because of its diffused nature. Third, adding transition experience to the 
eU’s efforts does not solve the problematic development aspects inherent in a mod-
ernization strategy centered on the transposition of the acquis. We investigate these 
three issues below.
Uploading to the EU
The eCe states have a strong interest in engaging with the eastern neighbors, but 
their preferences on how to do this diverge from those set on the eU level. They 
have achieved some success in forming these preferences, including a greater focus 
on civil society and the need to maintain the importance of flexible instruments to 
support democracy and human rights (evidenced by the creation of the european 
endowment for Democracy). These successes however have mostly only refined, 
rather than challenged, the eU’s approach to the region,36 and we will not investigate 
them in detail.
As outlined above, one of the issues on which the eCe states have attempted to 
influence eU policies towards the region, and has the strongest relevance for socio-
economic development and modernization, is the usage of their transition experi-
ence. They have achieved some success in this, especially regarding a rhetorical 
commitment from the eU to build on this experience. For example, Article 33 of the 
2006 european Consensus for Development37 states that “the eU will capitalize on 
new Member States’ experience (such as transition management) and help strengthen 
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the role of these countries as new donors.” The european Consensus does not form 
part of the hard law of the eU acquis, but it provided a foothold for the eCe states to 
lobby the eU institutions to “consider how to systematically employ transition expe-
rience in eU external action.”38 The eCe states called for eU financial instruments 
to utilize transition experience and explicitly called for earmarking funds dedicated 
to transition cooperation under the thematic programs of the eU’s Development 
Cooperation Instrument. This can be seen as suggesting that the eCe states have a 
financial interest in the uploading of transition experience, although it is also clear 
that without the eU “putting its money where its mouth is,” utilizing transition expe-
rience runs the risk of remaining a rhetorical commitment on paper. The earmarking 
of funds, however, has not happened, and Szent-Iványi showed that actors (mainly 
NgOs, but also private companies and government agencies) from the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia do rather poorly in winning eU-financed 
international development-related grants and contracts in the eastern Neighborhood 
countries.39 This highlights that whilst the eU is willing to allow eCe states to 
upload policy preferences at a rhetorical level, in many areas of external relations, 
especially those related to finance, they still play a role of “junior partners.”40
The fact that transition experience is not fully used in practice by the eU is also 
shown by a Commission policy document, endorsed by the Council in 2013, entitled 
EU Support for Sustainable Change in Transition Societies, which reiterated the 
need for a stronger use of transition experience in the eU’s external policies.41 
emphasizing the need to “make efficient use of knowledge-sharing and capacity 
development methods, including the use of transition experience of eU Member 
States’ signals that the eCe countries were not satisfied with the degree of their tran-
sition experience being integrated into eU policies.42
In terms of policy design, the eNP and the eaP have been driven by eU institu-
tions, with Dg enlargement playing a prominent role and shaping the policy. The 
very nature of eU decision making leaves little scope for member state involvement 
and substantive input. Larger and/or richer member states, such as Sweden, are able 
to devote considerable resources of their own to engage with the eastern countries on 
a bilateral basis (e.g., the Swedish International Development Agency, SIDA, has 
been very active in the region). Lacking such resources and institutional capacity, the 
eCe countries rely on the eU at large to factor in their transition experience.
The Nature of Transition Experience
Part of the difficulty of diffusing transition experience stemmed from the ambi-
guities of the concept. Transition experience spans a number of different sectors: 
reforms in the eCe countries basically impacted all areas of public life, making 
transition experience potentially an extremely broad term. estonia, for example, 
stresses “practical solutions” that embrace a wide scope of different areas: from 
democratic institutions and elections to different sectors of socio-economic reform, 
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including estonian models of e-governance, taxation, social security, health care, 
public administration build-up, domestic coordination of eU-related decision mak-
ing, transport and logistics systems, management of eU assistance and structural 
support, etc.43 Poland mentions, among other things, issues like developing small 
and medium enterprises, agricultural and rural development, counteracting environ-
mental degradation, climate change mitigation and adaptation, and building modern 
information management systems as parts of its transition experience.44 While the 
transition and integration process clearly impacted all of these sectors, has it really 
informed sectoral know-how to the extent to make estonia’s or Poland’s expertise 
unique? Other eCe countries do not seem to detail the content of their transition 
experience as much as these two countries do, and mainly imply that transition 
experience refers to sharing expertise between various actors (official and non-state) 
on reform processes. Nonetheless, it seems that if a country wants, it can argue that 
any knowledge transfer project that it undertakes with its partners is related to tran-
sition experience.
The conceptual challenge maps onto practical difficulties. How can ministries of 
foreign affairs (MFAs) in charge of international development policy actually har-
ness transition experience, which exists in a decentralized manner in different gov-
ernment agencies, NgOs and individual experts. How can those who conducted the 
reforms in eCe countries and hence possess transition experience, and may not even 
think of their knowledge as transferable to other countries, be engaged in develop-
ment cooperation? And, more broadly, how will the MFAs gather information on 
“who knows what”? This situation in essence leaves the eCe country free to label 
whatever they want as transition experience, turning the concept into a broad, catch-
all phrase with little substance.
The eCe member states were asked to collect information on their transition 
experience and report it to the Commission, which resulted in the publication of the 
european Transition Compendium (eTC) in 2011.45 This is basically a collection of 
projects, best practices, and actors from the eCe countries which may represent 
transition experience, and can serve as a basis for future projects. The eTC was pub-
lished with the intention of allowing for future additions and making it a “living” 
project. However, the project seems to have been “dead on arrival.” Some countries 
seem to have been more ambitious in collecting and reporting their transition experi-
ence than others. Hungary, for example, only reported 7 projects, while estonia 
added 30, leading to about 320 projects in total. It is curious why the eCe countries 
did not put a larger effort into collecting their transition experience, when they advo-
cated the issue themselves. This can be explained by the fact that MFAs did not have 
the capacity to solve the domestic “who knows what” problems, and more generally 
were not interested in limiting the scope of their transition experience to what is in 
the eTC.46 Regular checks on the eTC database reveal that the planned updates are 
not really happening, and the list of projects included has only marginally increased 
compared to the initial version. The failure of the eTC is implicitly acknowledged by 
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the Commission47 as it calls for a “broader platform” for knowledge sharing, and has 
recently been favoring another portal, capacity4dev.
Transition Experience and Development
Transferring transition experience requires a development policy based heavily 
on technical cooperation tied to procurement from donor country experts, and is thus 
highly supply driven, allowing little scope for national ownership and alignment 
with recipient priorities. effective aid practices assumes the recipient country 
requests the form of assistance it requires from the eU, rather than the eU proposing 
solutions. Despite the rhetoric of differentiation and partnership, the eU’s policy 
towards the neighborhood have been eU-driven. This applies not only to eU institu-
tions but also to how the eCe countries promote their transition experience. This is 
evident in sectors with thin acquis (e.g., regional decentralization, public administra-
tion reform, health sector, education, etc.) as well as in areas with thick acquis, 
where eCe countries merely endeavor to convey eU templates (competition policy, 
sanitary and phyto-sanitary, intellectual property rights). Their approach is clearly 
supply-driven as they offer ready-made solutions based on their own experience and 
hence are more attuned to the specific needs and context of the recipient countries.
Ultimately, transferring transition experience relies on the model of technical 
assistance, which has been largely deemed ineffective and discouraged in the devel-
opment context.48 Amongst others, the technical assistance model generates what 
Carothers refers to as the “problem of knowledge” and understanding of the local 
context in which reforms are promoted as well as an ownership issue.49 How likely 
are reforms to be maintained if they are seen to be products of external advice and 
have little domestic ownership?
This is closely linked to the type and scale of funds available. There is evidence 
that “linkages matter” in relation to democracy promotion.50 This would suggest that 
the short-term trips, trainings, seminars, and study visits that are frequently favored 
forms of assistance provided by the eCe countries to the eastern neighbors would be 
effective linkages. However, their effectiveness in relation to eCe transition experi-
ence is often questionable, with extensive yet anecdotal evidence of officials from 
eastern partner countries treating them more as “tourist trips” to visit Bratislava or 
Tallinn rather than learning opportunities.51 So is hosting “hundreds of officials from 
the eastern Partnership countries” to be trained in, say, estonia, the most effective 
way to promote learning?52 When looking at lists of transition experience transfer 
projects from the eCe countries, one is confronted with an endless number of techni-
cal training sessions, workshops, and expert and study visits. Providing a compre-
hensive picture is difficult because of limitations in data; however, the evidence 
available so far indicates an overt reliance on training and study visits. An informa-
tion booklet published by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, clearly 
gives the impression that Poland’s activities consist largely of providing training, or 
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sending experts, often with the view of transposing the eU acquis. A recent evalua-
tion of the Czech Republic’s assistance in human rights, democracy, and societal 
transformation to georgia has highlighted the low sustainability of study visits and 
training due to high staff turnover in government, especially after elections.53
Having said that, there is some evidence that the problems of knowledge/local con-
text are less acute in the case of eCe transition export and that eCes can fill in some 
gaps at a short notice when responding to specific needs of the neighboring countries.54 
The small Romanian think-tank mentioned earlier successfully reached out to domestic 
actors in Moldova at a time when Moldova suffered embargos on fruits and wine from 
Russia, while not being able to access the eU market due to lack of infrastructure and 
appropriate know-how. Their ability to communicate in Romanian and explain the 
issues in an accessible way helped local actors, something that the eU Delegation in 
Chis
´
inău was not able to engage in. The Romanian experts articulated the need for the 
eU institutions to be more pro-active in helping Moldova to re-orient its exports to the 
eU market.55 Symptomatically, the project was co-funded by an “old” member state, 
namely the Dutch embassy in Bucharest. This also shows that the eCe countries are 
valued as partners for the “old” members not least because of lower cultural and lan-
guage barriers. But, ultimately, this does not mean an acknowledgement of their experts 
being able to export transition experience by making a sustainable and tangible impact.
Finally, there are issues of coordination and resources. Institutional coordination 
within the eCe countries appears to decrease effectiveness of assistance. In the 
Czech case, for example, transition experience is dealt with separately from develop-
ment56 as the area is addressed by the Transition Promotion Program, run by the 
Department of Human Rights and Transition Policy within the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and not the Development Department. In case of Poland, Hungary, or Latvia, 
a large number of state agencies and line ministries are involved in international 
development, which has led to coordination problems and parallel initiatives which 
have decreased effectiveness.57
The nature of bilateral assistance means that coordination between the eCe coun-
tries is limited, each implementing a considerable number of small projects. For 
example, upon the launch of the eastern Partnership, Ukraine agreed that Lithuania 
could organize training for Ukrainian civil servants on different aspects of european 
integration. Additionally, Ukraine held expert consultations with Poland in December 
2009 involving several ministries and other central authorities and a discussion of 
potential joint projects. Cooperation with Slovakia on civil servants’ training devel-
oped in parallel.58 This diffused approach inherent in eCe states’ bilateral strategies 
towards the eastern neighbors leads to the classic sins of developmental assistance: 
fragmentation and a lack of coordination.59 Yet for relatively small agencies to har-
ness their transition experience and match it with actual demand in partner countries 
is already a considerable challenge, leaving little scope for coordination amongst the 
eCe agencies themselves. Without such coordination, any impact these small proj-
ects achieve is likely to remain small-scale and local.
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The Question No One Dares to Ask: Does the Adoption of the Acquis 
Really Promote Development?
Much of eCe transition experience relates to preparation for eU membership, 
which requires adoption of the acquis. This makes the eCe countries well posi-
tioned to share this experience with the countries further east. There are reasons to 
be skeptical about just how effective a tool the adoption of the acquis can be for 
promoting development in the eastern neighborhood. The main issue is related to 
the suitability, relevance, and clarity of the acquis. The intricate and dynamic sys-
tem of eU rules was developed for market economies and is not easily transposed 
to the eastern partner countries, given their political, economic, and administrative 
contexts. In essence, there are few signposts on how the acquis should be used for 
developmental rather than accession purposes. eU officials tasked with deciding on 
an appropriate level of approximation have often been unclear what they aim to 
achieve.60 Without a clear blueprint, eU officials and experts involved in the 
eastern neighborhood have been resorting to a default maximalist—enlargement-
like—interpretation.61 This interpretation was shared by both officials in eU insti-
tutions and officials from the “old” and new member states, as the accession 
context was the one they tended to be familiar with. As a side effect of this, the 
eU’s strategy has become supply-driven and not attuned to the regional context, nor 
is it sufficiently sensitive and responsive to partner countries’ needs and capacities 
to facilitate domestic reforms.
The relationship between the adoption of eU rules and development (or modern-
ization as it is referred to in eU documents) is not straightforward. While being the 
lynchpin of eU integration, the acquis is, in fact, a questionable blueprint for a fea-
sible and cost-effective reform process of non-member states.62 This had been raised 
during enlargement, but accession conditionality marginalized any debates and con-
cerns.63 One issue relates to the incongruity between the nature of the eU’s “offer” 
and transformation processes in the eastern neighborhood.64 The eU’s strategy 
requires adoption of reforms in a relatively short period of time, namely, five to eight 
years, while the positive impact of these changes are unlikely to bring immediate 
economic growth and welfare benefits, and cannot be justified by the promise of 
ultimate membership. As was the case during enlargement, the eNP/eaP relies on 
“deferred gratification” along the lines of “reforms now, benefits later” as recognized 
by the european Commission.65 The size of the reward has been a “weak spot” in the 
eU’s eastern policy, because what the eU offers cannot compensate for the hard 
domestic reforms which it advocates.
The scale and type of domestic adjustments envisaged under the eNP/eaP present 
a particular challenge for post-Soviet states, as they all suffer from poor governance 
and very low institutional and administrative capacity. In many instances, transfer of 
eU rules is designed to address the very problems which hamper the convergence 
with the acquis in the first place, such as political instability, lack of rule of law, weak 
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administrative capacity, corruption, and frozen conflicts.66 Therefore, in many 
respects, eU policies in the eastern neighborhood have not necessarily been closely 
matched with, and suited to, partner countries’ needs, capabilities, and priorities 
insofar as the modernization objectives are concerned.67
Insights from the international development literature can underline the problems 
that a development strategy based on acquis adoption poses. First, the eU is in the 
driving seat and decides on the scope and prerequisites for functional integration. As 
such, it is not a “problem-driven” or “recipient-driven” approach which international 
donors, including the World Bank, increasingly promote in development assistance, 
upon recognition that assistance is most effective when tailored to particular circum-
stances.68 A clear example of this is the requirement for Moldova to introduce a 
system of monitoring state aid. The actual justification for a system is very question-
able as most of agriculture, which is a key sector in Moldova, is excluded whereas 
heavy industry is based in Transdnistria, leaving not much to actually monitor. Yet an 
extensive and expensive system is being created to satisfy eU requirements.69
Second, there is no search for feasible strategies for reforms. Often transposition 
of the acquis has become a focal point. The eU seems to pursue the “ideal neighbor” 
model (e.g. Norway) as a desired level of legal approximation. There is no evidence 
of considering a “second-best mindset,” as advocated by some aid donors, including 
the World Bank. International experience shows that best-practice legislation and 
institutions often set the bar too high and reforms are derailed as a result. Partial 
reforms, involving adaptation of law to domestic circumstances, could deliver better 
and more sustainable results than pursuing optimal but unrealistic goals.70 Yet the eU 
appears to favor the optimal, textbook approach, that is, seeking full compliance with 
the acquis.
Third, while a comprehensive and uniform agenda is pursued by the eU, there is 
relatively little attention paid to country-specific context and priorities. The neigh-
borhood policy falls between the two stools: enlargement and development. On the 
one hand, it has been a target for an extensive export of the acquis, in line with the 
enlargement approach. Yet, this export was not preceded or accompanied by enlarge-
ment-like planning and resources. Domestic demand for policy templates is pre-
sumed.71 While the eaP is characterized by an ambivalent finalité and inadequate 
resources, the eU institutions have had little incentives and resources to question the 
use of the textbook enlargement approach in the eastern neighborhood. In practice, 
the european external Action Service (eeAS) and individual Dgs, such as Dg 
Trade, Dg energy, Dg Competition etc. define their expectations and devise recom-
mendations vis-à-vis the partner countries, often with little appreciation and/or 
understanding of their context, capacity, and situation.72
Fourth, in absence of other “developmental” benchmarks adopted by the eU and 
its institutions, legal approximation seems to be equated with reforms. If countries 
are adopting laws transposing the acquis, it means they are successful in pursuing 
reforms. Legal approximation becomes a measure of success rather than actually 
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successfully addressing pervasive problems faced by those countries, such as lower-
ing corruption or poverty reduction. In other words, progress in formal adoption of 
eU rules is used as a benchmark for measuring progress in modernization.
The domestic costs of transformation are highly prohibitive and the external ben-
efits provided by the eU are not sufficient to offset them. In particular, the contribu-
tion of eCe countries to the overall structure of eU’s external benefits is not sufficient 
(in the language of set theory) to offset the prohibitive domestic costs.73 As pointed 
above, bilateral, small-scale projects can be effective when actually responding to 
the demands of the partner countries. However, by their very nature, such projects, 
especially when dispersed across a number of fields, could only have a limited, local-
ized impact. Such bilateral assistance cannot overcome the domestic barriers to 
reforms. These include the lack of the drive for reforms by the incumbent elites and/
or opposition from state officials interested in preserving their rent-seeking 
activities.
Ultimately, the difficulty with exporting transition experience stems from the fact 
that the post-communist reforms have been a complex, multi-faceted process in 
which external actors supported and reinforced the domestic reform drive.74 A coin-
cidence of domestic and external factors in eCe has been largely unique and not 
easily replicable elsewhere, especially by the means of small-scale projects.
Conclusions
The eastern policy of the eU was launched in 2004, that is, simultaneously with 
eastern enlargement and, in many respects, was designed to capitalize on enlarge-
ment, but without concurrent political and economic commitments from the eU. 
eCe states have consistently expressed an interest in seeing the eastern neighbors 
reforming, and contributed their own transition experience. But the eCe input has 
not made much difference in terms of enhancing the policies of the eU. While they 
did have some impact on the way the eU promotes democracy in the region, in terms 
of promotion of socio-economic modernization, beyond the conclusion of the 
Association Agreements, actual progress has so far been very limited and the influ-
ence of the eU has been reduced to three of six states in the eastern neighborhood.
We identify a number of factors accounting for eCe countries’ inability to enhance 
the effectiveness of eU’s eastern policy. The picture which emerges is that being 
mesmerized with their own experience of accession, which is part of the “claim to 
fame” in the eU, the eCe countries inadvertently perpetuated and exacerbated the 
weaknesses in the eU’s overall strategy, which centers on the export of rules to pro-
mote socio-economic modernization. The arduous process of implementation of the 
Association Agreements, requiring political will, administrative capacity, and mas-
sive costs, will further test the ability of the eCe countries to deliver on their special 
expertise to facilitate the implementation.
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Many of the broader criticisms we offer in this article are not unique to eCe 
activities. Carothers highlights that in the field of democracy promotion, there is a 
need to learn from past experiences to develop smarter methods and thereby achieve 
better results.75 There are successful micro-level individual projects funded by eCe 
actors that could update thinking on how best to “facilitate” change in the eastern 
neighbourhood, but our study has found little evidence that the eCe states are under-
taking this type of rigorous review across the areas encompassed by the eU acquis, 
although it might be a case of “time will tell.” Thus, the case of eCe shows the criti-
cal and nuanced way in which rule transfer works. Being a successful “target” for 
policy transfers does not automatically prepare a country for a subsequent effective 
export of this experience. Paradoxically, while stressing their transition experience, 
the eCe countries may have underestimated the intricate interplay of both domestic 
and eU-level factors which underpinned their own successes and which are not eas-
ily replicated despite their own engagement in “europeanisation further east.”
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